Acute stress has been linked with prosocial behavior, yet it is entirely unexplored how different types of stressors may affect individuals’ willingness to help: This is particularly relevant while people is experiencing multiple sources of stress due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Here we explore whether different types of stress influence peoples’ giving behavior and the moderating role of emotional intelligence. Undergraduate students were exposed to experimentally induced social, cognitive, or emotional stress and were asked to self-report on their willingness to (...) help and donate to a charity raising funds for COVID-19 and flu patients. Results showed that when compared to a control condition, after being exposed to a social stress, participants were more willing to help a person in need. Our results also provide evidence that, after experiencing a social stress, participants with high trait EI were more willing to help, and, as a result, donated more. Findings indicate that moderate levels of distress are associated with increased donations. Interestingly, when stress is not too threatening, high EI can regulate it and promote prosocial behaviors. (shrink)

Chi è quel soggetto che nell’autobiografia dice “io”? Raccontarsi non è già diventare altro? L’autobiografia è un esercizio filosofico in cui l’identità si scopre tramata da altre vite e l’io emerge soltanto perché dislocato nei suoi segni. Sono forse proprio le condizioni di impossibilità di un’autopresentazione trasparente e definitiva che rendono possibile una soggettività autobiografica. Scrivere di sé infatti è già trascendenza: insinua il sospetto di un’alterità, di un’alterazione e turba la rigida identità, che si presume autonoma e precedente alle (...) sue iscrizioni. L’intreccio tra autós, bíos e graphein non è dunque una neutra auto-espressione, ma uno specchio in cui il proprio volto è riflesso e capovolto, il sé si racconta e si ascolta, recita e osserva. In che modo quindi l’autobiografia è un luogo di verità? «La verità può essere il cuore dell’autobiografia», afferma John M. Coetzee, «ma ciò non vuol dire che l’autobiografia abbia a cuore la verità». Ogni lettera scritta traccia l’aderenza di sé a sé e alle cose, nell’istante stesso in cui marca una separazione e una distanza. In questo paradosso si infrange ogni pretesa di obiettività o di adeguazione. Qui la trasparenza dell’io viene disdetta, come anche la sua sovranità del discorso. L’autobiografia è, allora, la scrittura impossibile come unica iscrizione possibile: il tentativo estremo di restituire il senso di una vita incompiuta, di dare una verità senza verità, di raccontare di sé da sé. È una messa in scena dell’identità e della propria distanza, un’autosospensione e una torsione tropica dell’io, che si racconta e si espone. Dietro ogni scrittura autobiografica c’è infatti un nome proprio, che sigilla l’autore, il narratore, il personaggio. Ma proprio in questa firma si custodisce, più che il diritto a una proprietà, la promessa di verità per sé e per gli altri: un corpo a corpo con la lingua e con la propria storia. (shrink)

Experiences of contact with nature in school education might be beneficial for promoting ecological lifestyles and the wellbeing of children, families, and teachers. Many theories and empirical evidence on restorative environments, as well as on the foundations of classical pedagogical approaches, recognize the value of the direct experience with natural elements, and the related psychological and educational outcomes. In this work we present two studies focusing on the contact with nature in outdoor education interventions with primary and secondary school students (...) in Italy. A questionnaire measuring connectedness to nature, psycho-physical wellbeing, pro-environmental attitudes, students’ life satisfaction, pro-social behavior, empathy and anxiety was completed before and after the education program by the participants to the intervention group and by students of a control group. The students in the intervention groups participated in environmental education programs consisting in guided activities in contact with the nature during four visits in one of two natural protected areas. The students in the control groups attended the same schools as the intervention group but they were not involved in the environmental education program. The students in both the groups completed the questionnaire in the same weeks of the year. Findings show that taking part to the outdoor education program has positive outcomes on psycho-physical wellbeing, on connectedness to nature and on pro-social behavior of students in the intervention group, compared to the control group. The implications related to the effectiveness of outdoor education interventions and future directions of research and practice in environmental psychology and education are discussed. (shrink)

We review the history of the philosophy of fondue since Aristotle so as to arrive at the formulation of the paradox of Swiss fondue. Either the wine and the cheese cease to exist (Buridan), but then the fondue is not really a mixture of wine and cheese. Or the wine and the cheese continue to exist. If they do, then either they continue to exist in different places (the chemists), but then a fondue can never be perfectly homogenous (it is (...) a French fondue). Or the wine and the cheese continue to exist in the same place (the Stoïcs), but then wine and cheese have to be, oddly, penetrable and spatially expansible. Aristote attempted to solve this paradox by arguing that the cheese and wine continue to exist, but only potentially in the fondue. We sketch an alternative answer. The wine and the cheese continue to exist, but only non-spatially in the fondue. Wine and cheese, once mixed, become non-spatial constituents of the fondue, a bit like character traits are non-spatial constituents of persons. The wine and the cheese are in the fondue, but only the fondue is there in the fondue pot. (shrink)

Psychological observations are by now well integrated into economics, especially in the theory of finance, as can also be seen in the Nobel Prize awarded to Thaler. On the contrary, Simon’s attempt to reforge economic theory on the paradigm of bounded rationality failed. Starting from the birth of the neoclassical paradigm, we’ll describe the attempt to give it psychological foundations with a direct measurement of utility, then the axiomatic turn of the paradigm and its first anomalies. We’ll then sum up (...) the debate on rationality, taking place in the group of economists led by Simon, which brought to the rational expectations hypothesis. Finally, we’ll discuss the development of behavioral economics and its progressive acceptance in economic theory. This historical reconstruction allows us to understand the actual hard core of the neoclassical paradigm and the growing need of the paradigm for practical flexibility that determines how to choose arguments, methods and evidence that can be useful to its development, including psychological ones. (shrink)

El contexto social actual está protagonizado por una ciudadanía diferenciada o multicultural. La titularidad de derechos fundamentales de los sujetos integrantes y el valor de la dignidad humana como valor cualif icado debe regir las relaciones, incluso en el caso de que tales derechos deban ser limitados. Para Ferrajoli son derechos fundamentales todos aquellos derechos subjetivos que corresponden universalmente a todos los seres humanos en cuanto dotados del status de ciudadanos o personas con capacidad de obrar, entendiendo por derecho subjetivo (...) cualquier expectativa positiva o negativa adscrita a un sujeto por una norma jurídica positiva. Los derechos fundamentales son universales y ese universalismo puede relacionarse, según Ferrajoli, con el multiculturalismo. Dicha universalidad no debe entrar en contraposición con la identidad cultural. (shrink)

La doctrine scolastique des transcendantaux est dans une mesure certaine hérìtée de la philosophie arabe. La construction de la problématique de l'un transcendantal, convertible avec l'être, et de l'un numérique, non convertible, illustre bien cette dépendance: toute la discussion scolastique reproduit les grandes lignes de la position d'Avicenne, puis la critique d'Avicenne par Averroès. L'article essaie de reconstituer l'ensemble des questions, lieux et arguments qui constituent cette problématique en en suivant l'évolution grâce à l'analyse desophismataanonymes et de textes de Nicolas (...) de Paris, de Roger Bacon, d'Albert le Grand et de Jacques de Viterbe. Deux stades sont distingués: le premier centré sur la distinction entre un transcendantal et un numérique; le second, essentiellement allemand (Dietrich de Freiberg, Berthold de Moosburg), sur la subordination de l'un transcendantal (“aristotélicien”) à 1'Un transcendant (“platonicien”). Chemin faisant, on montre que, à l'exception des philosophes allemands, la compréhension de la “position d'Avicenne” reste filtrée par l'interprétation d'Averroès. (shrink)

Peut-on prouver que l’âme raisonnable est par elle-même et essentiellement forme du corps? C’est pour résoudre cette question que des générations de lecteurs d’Averroès recourent à la distinction entre forme inhérente et forme assistante. On examine l’histoire de cette distinction dans l’après-coup du concile de Vienne (1312) et du concile de Latran V (1513), dans sa triple dimension noétique, ontologique et anthropologique. On présente les sources et les divers aspects de la théorie averroïste de la forme assistante, de Siger de (...) Brabant à la scolastique tardive et à la première modernité, selon laquelle l’intellect n’est ni forme inhérente ni moteur séparé, mais forme séparée. (shrink)

Le lecteur ne trouvera pas ici de melanges; classees en quatre chapitres, les articles et les traductions rassembles illustrent l'unite et la diversite du propos qui les a inspires: histoire des traditions scientifiques et textuelles (d'Euclide au Timee latin), logique et philosophie du langage (d'Abelard a Guillaume d'Ockham), psychologie et noetique (autour d'Aristote, d'Avicenne et d'Averroes), exegese et theologie (de Boece a Buridan).

L’A. retrace l’histoire des propriétés individuelles de l’Antiquité et du Moyen Âge à la lumière de la théorie des tropes de D.C. Williams et Campbell. Il insiste sur l’importance de la relation de co-présence et la compare avec des notions apparentées (comme le « syndrome des qualités » ou le « rassemblement des qualités »). L’A. examine également la validité des principes du particularisme ontologique pour la philosophie d’Abélard. Il s’attache à l’examen de la thèse de la non-transférabilité des tropes, (...) chez Boèce, Abélard, et il en rappelle les origines dans l’Islam classique (théologie ash’arite). L’A. insiste sur le fait, en conclusion, que ce particularisme ontologique n’a pas forcément partie liée avec le nominalisme. (shrink)

Traducción al español de De Libera, A., “Les sources gréco-arabes de la théorie médiévale de l’analogie de l’être”, _Les Études Philosophiques_, n° 3-4, julio-diciembre de1989, pp. 319-345.

L’interprétation d’Augustin à partir des Confessions par J.-L. Marion est une topologie de la charité (c’est-à-dire aussi une topique ou logique de l’amour), qui propose à la fois une théologie de l’adonné et une phénoménologie de la grâce. On en présente les principales thèses et quelques concepts fondamentaux en montrant et défendant l’arrière-plan théologique de la troisième voie explorée avec Augustin entre ego transcendantal et moi empirique : celle, précisément, de l’adonné, incompatible avec toute notion de sujet au sens aristotélicien (...) du terme. La lecture d’Augustin par Marion est enracinée dans la lecture augustinienne des Psaumes. Elle ne fait intervenir ni Es gibt heideggérien ni Es denkt anticartésien. Elle est aussi non gilsonienne. Comme telle elle échappe à l’horizon de la métaphysique, qu’il s’agisse de la métaphysique de l’Exode ou de la métaphysique de la conversion, en plaidant pour une lecture apophatique de l’Idipsum (« Lui-même ») comme principal Nom divin. (shrink)

This article offers a tentative deconstruction of Heidegger’s account of the “modern,” that is, the “Cartesian,” “subject.” It argues that subjectivity, understood as the idea of some “thing” that is both the owner of certain mental states and the agent of certain activities, is a medieval theological construct, based on two conflicting models of the mind (nous, mens) inherited from ancient philosophy and theology: the Aristotelian and the Augustinian (or perichoretic) one, developed in connection with such problems as that of (...) the two wills in the incarnate Christ. Starting with Nietzsche’s criticism of the “superstition of logicians” (the belief that“the subject I is the condition of the predicate think”) and Peter Strawson’s question in Individuals (“Why are one’s states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all?”), the article discusses Peter Olivi’s and Thomas Aquinas’s treatments of the problem, as well as the principle invoked to resolve it: actiones sunt suppositorum, “actions belong to subjects.” Against this background, the discussion refers to Heidegger’s notion of “subjecticity” and Armstrong’s “attribute-theory” in order to reappraise the Hobbesian and Leibnizian contributions to the history of the Self. (shrink)

This article offers a tentative deconstruction of Heidegger’s account of the “modern,” that is, the “Cartesian,” “subject.” It argues that subjectivity, understood as the idea of some “thing” that is both the owner of certain mental states and the agent of certain activities, is a medieval theological construct, based on two conflicting models of the mind (nous, mens) inherited from ancient philosophy and theology: the Aristotelian and the Augustinian (or perichoretic) one, developed in connection with such problems as that of (...) the two wills in the incarnate Christ. Starting with Nietzsche’s criticism of the “superstition of logicians” (the belief that“the subject I is the condition of the predicate think”) and Peter Strawson’s question in Individuals (“Why are one’s states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all?”), the article discusses Peter Olivi’s and Thomas Aquinas’s treatments of the problem, as well as the principle invoked to resolve it: actiones sunt suppositorum, “actions belong to subjects.” Against this background, the discussion refers to Heidegger’s notion of “subjecticity” and Armstrong’s “attribute-theory” in order to reappraise the Hobbesian and Leibnizian contributions to the history of the Self. (shrink)

Driving behaviours and fitness to drive have been assessed using different tools over time: standardized neuropsychological, on-road and driving simulation testing. Nowadays, the great variability of topics related to driving simulation has elicited a high number of reviews. The present work aims to perform a scientometric analysis on driving simulation reviews and to propose a selective review of reviews focusing on critical issues related to validity and fidelity. A scientometric analysis of driving simulation reviews published from 1988 to 2019 was (...) conducted. Bibliographic data from 298 reviews were extracted from Scopus and WoS. Performance analysis was conducted to investigate most prolific Countries, Journals, Institutes and Authors. A cluster analysis on authors’ keywords was performed to identify relevant associations between different research topics. Based on reviews extracted from cluster analysis, a selective review of reviews was conducted to answer questions regarding validity, fidelity and critical issues. USA and Germany are the first two Countries for number of driving simulation reviews. USA is the leading Country with 5 Institutes in the top-ten. Top Authors wrote from 3 to 7 reviews each and belong to Institutes located in North America and Europe. Cluster analysis identified three clusters and eight keywords. The selective review of reviews showed a substantial agreement for supporting validity of driving simulation with respect to neuropsychological and on-road testing, while for fidelity with respect to real-world driving experience a blurred representation emerged. The most relevant critical issues were the a) lack of a common set of standards, b) phenomenon of simulation sickness, c) need for psychometric properties, lack of studies investigating d) predictive validity with respect to collision rates and e) ecological validity. Driving simulation represent a cross-cutting topic in scientific literature on driving, and there are several evidences for considering it as a valid alternative to neuropsychological and on-road testing. Further research efforts could be aimed at establishing a consensus statement for protocols assessing fitness to drive, in order to a) use standardized systems, b) compare systematically driving simulators with regard to their validity and fidelity, and c) employ shared criteria for conducting studies in a given sub-topic. (shrink)

The German philosophical culture of the Middle Ages is inextricable linked to the thought of Albert the Great. This volume brings together 14 papers, which deal with Albert's influence from the points of view of mysticism, philosophy, and the history of universities.

L'objet des conférences ici rassemblées est de réfléchir sur les limites du dialogue entre pensée médiévale et pensée moderne en se concentrant sur une difficulté récurrente de la sémantique des propositions : la question de la référence vide, proposant ainsi une histoire des théories du signifié prépositionnel.

Brentano’s relationship to Alexander Bain has so far received little attention. The first part of this paper argues that the basic tenets of the so-called Intentionality thesis should be considered as systematically opposed to a complex of principles borrowed by Brentano from two major works by the scottish philosopher and psychologist: The Senses and the Intellect and the ‘Compendium’ on Mental and Moral Science. Bain’s doctrine is based on two sets of claims: T1 There is only a negative definition of (...) Mind: a definition “by contrast” as the “unextended”; There is a small number of general properties, whose divison under “three heads” is all that can be offered as a positive definition of Mind; those heads are Feeling, Volition, Thought or Cognition. T2 There is no one fact or property that embraces all the three; the three classes of mental phenomena do not imply each other. Brentano’s reply is based on the very opposite claims: *T1 there are several negative definitions of mind, all questionable, but there is a positive definition of Mind, that is well-grounded and not subjected to further criticisms; the division of mental phenomena must be restated on this new positive basis; the new “heads”of the new division are: Presentation, Judgement and Feeling. *T2 there is one common property that does characterize every mental phenomenon : Intentional In-existence; the phenomena of the three fundamental classes are most intimately “intertwined”; “there is no mental act in which all three are not present”. The second part of the paper discusses at length Brentano’s criticism of Bain’s theory of volition as a feeling-prompted activity. (shrink)